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Abstract
This study focuses on how Social Media Networks (SMN) have been used in recent times to 
champion social protests and resistance against oppression and political power abuse. Hence, 
‘discourse of resistance’ takes a cue from the current waves of resistance and political revolutions 
in North Africa and the Arab world, which have been largely attributed to the vibrant SMN. 
In Nigeria, SMN have been used to mobilize support and active participation in popular efforts to 
achieve socio-political reforms. The corpus comprises mainly blogs and discussion forums hosted 
by the Biafra Online Campaign Groups (BOCG). The BOCG consist of persons and groups of the 
Igbo ethnic group of Nigeria, living in and outside of the country, that advocate a separate nation 
for the Igbos and accuse the government of Nigeria of marginalizing them. The study applies a 
sociolinguistic-based Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to investigate how sociolinguistic issues 
such as virtual community, identity, language variations and social interaction are used to project 
self-determination and the struggle for political independence. It further examines how ideology 
is reflected in this context via the discourses produced by BOCG in relation to the Nigerian state.
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Introduction
Resistance is bound to happen, where power exists (Eamonn, 2004). And when individu-
als or a group of people begin to feel oppressed or perceive that their individual/collective 
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human rights are violated by other individuals, a constituted authority or government, 
they begin to muster strength to effect a change by ‘their own means or with the help of 
others to attain a certain state of happiness’ or freedom (p. 35). Therefore, resistance 
occurs when people feel that change is desperately needed either gradually, or immedi-
ately or spontaneously. In recent times, people have begun to take their future in their own 
hands in their attempts to resist the dominant powers that oppress them.
Previous investigations into the relationship between resistance and discourse show 
that resistances do occur through social/political, organizational or educational discourses. 
According to Wilson and Stapleton (2007: 393), for example, this happens ‘through 
thematic frameworks and interactional/pragmatic strategies’ (e.g. ‘pragmatic blocking’), 
where speakers jointly produce a ‘discourse of resistance’, for example resisting a new 
police service in Northern Ireland. Putnam et al. (2005) also demonstrate that dis-
course analytical approaches can reveal how acts of resistance target multiple organiza-
tional audiences, often developed through diverse texts directed at internal and 
external stakeholders. Through this method, the ‘intended and unintended conse-
quences of resistance’ are revealed, highlighting how members in an organization engage 
with, adapt to and transform organizational practices (p. 5).
Recent developments in the Arab world have clearly demonstrated the power of media 
discourses to champion social resistance and political protests. Some observers have 
attributed the success of the North African revolution to the use of new media and social 
networking sites. Both the Tunisian and Egyptian protests were constantly in the spot-
light of most political blogs, Facebook and Twitter; they were also covered in online 
discussion forums and in many virtual mailing lists. The North African revolutionary 
experience, with its huge implications for the rise of new paradigms for political change 
and government in the Arab Muslim world, demonstrates the potential for similar 
uprisings, not only in the Muslim world but also in other parts of Africa.
In his article ‘New media and the information revolution in the Arab world’, 
Ghareeb (2000) agreed that there was already an ‘information revolution’ in the 
Muslim world, initially limited to the elite, which was transforming political discourse 
in the region. Beginning with the spread of pan-Arab newspapers published simultane-
ously in several cities, and continuing with the growth of satellite television networks 
(e.g. Al-Jazeera based in Qatar), new technologies had created a new type of political 
debate that transcended national boundaries. Ghareeb admitted that the Internet, while 
just beginning, had impacted significantly on the Arab world with even greater future 
potential. Contrary to the present widespread popularity of the Internet, Ghareeb 
(2000) had feared that the influence of social media might be limited primarily to the 
elite due to high access costs and its largely English-language content. However, the 
role of keeping the public informed and holding governments accountable is gradually 
shifting to individuals, notably the youth, armed with social media networks that are 
increasingly re-shaping news agendas and political landscapes.
The Egyptian revolution has been described as a ‘Twitter revolution’, where Twitter 
became the alternative press and was primarily used as a means of reporting daily events 
for the benefit of the average Egyptian and the outside world. It was also a key site ‘for 
emancipating bursts of self-expression’ (Idle and Nunns, 2011: 139). Smith and Brecher 
(2010) argue that social movements need the kind of communication networks which 
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social media provide, and that social media networks (SMN) do indeed contribute to the 
process of forming social movements as well as effective social action. Tao (2011) agrees 
with Smith and Brecher, and affirms that social media indeed ‘fuelled’ the North African 
revolution by inspiring and mobilizing protesters. Sensing the power of Facebook and 
Twitter, the Egyptian government had cut off Internet and mobile services in most of the 
country. However, inspired by the Tunisian revolution, thousands of protesters joined a 
Facebook anti-government campaign with more than 30,600 people in the Facebook 
group.1 Protesters gathered in the city centre around Tahrir Square into the night and 
there were appeals on Facebook for food and blankets for those remaining there. In addi-
tion to Facebook and Twitter, Google indexed millions of new blog posts and thousands 
of news results citing Egypt during the period.
In Libya, protesters mostly inspired by the success of the uprisings in Tunisia and 
Egypt took to the streets in February 2011 in an attempt to end Muammar Gaddafi’s 
42-year rule. As violent clashes erupted between anti-government protesters and secu-
rity agents in Benghazi, social networks again played their roles. Facebook, Twitter 
and Al Jazeera were intermittently blocked and by 18 February, Internet access was 
completely blocked. However, social media was ‘unstoppable’ (Raddatz, 2011). When 
connectivity was later restored, protesters took full advantage to post reports and 
events on Twitter. According to Raddatz (2011), social media also ignited protests in 
Iran, Bahrain and Yemen. The biggest mass pro-election protests in Iran in 2009, which 
resulted in members of parliament asking for the execution of the opposition leader, 
and the fierce uprisings in Yemen that called for the ousting of the authoritarian president, 
were attributed to the ‘social media revolution’.
Social media use in Nigeria
Socio-political and economic interests, as well as events in Nigeria, have helped fuel the 
formation of virtual communities and online discussion forums. During the era of mili-
tary dictatorship in Nigeria, there was a complete ban on political activities; social 
groups and political associations were outlawed, especially during the Abacha govern-
ment (Babatope, 2000). Politicians, journalists and social activists/critics were arrested 
and jailed without trial (Chiluwa, 2011a, 2012). However, after 29 May 1999, when 
Nigeria returned to civil rule after over 20 years of military dictatorship, Nigerians, 
notably the youth, for the first time began to make their voices heard; social media net-
works became the more active means of participating in political debates (Chiluwa, 
2012); blogging activities began and several hosting sites also began to form. NaijaPals 
(also known as Nigerians and friends), for example, is a popular online community and 
a hosting website with social networking and blogging activities that allows users to 
exchange information. This virtual community is still very much alive today and par-
ticipants keep personal journals in which they post entries; others can reply to the entries 
by posting comments. Members not only post comments, they also engage in forms of 
social analyses and criticisms of Nigeria’s socio-political system, thus participants lend 
their voices to asking for political reforms (Chiluwa, 2011c, 2012). Similarly, the 
‘Nigerian Village Square’, also known as ‘a market place of ideas’, was established in 
2003, and became a ‘virtual sphere’ whose ‘participants are members of the civil society 
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brought together with a common understanding to maintain a platform for discursive 
evaluations of socio-political and economic developments’ in Nigeria (Ifukor, 2011: 113).
Interestingly, not only are social rights groups, youths and political activists involved 
in social media practice, Nigerian politicians are also becoming active participants. 
Political parties and campaign groups are on Facebook, Twitter and discussion forums, 
encouraged by the success of social media networks in other places, such as the Barack 
Obama 2008 presidential campaign (Chiluwa, 2011c; Ifukor, 2010). Political campaign 
groups utilized social media networks to canvass for votes for their candidates during 
the period of the 2011 general election in Nigeria. And as more people acquire Internet 
literacy, they take the advantage of the flexibility of social network options available in 
blogs and online communities to participate in social debates and political governance 
(Chiluwa, 2011c).
Biafran online resistance
The ‘Republic of Biafra’ was a secessionist nation of the Igbo of south-east Nigeria that 
existed between 30 May 1967 and 15 January 1970. It became defunct after a civil war 
in which over three million Igbos died (see Aneke, 2007; Dike, 2006). The defeat of the 
Igbo and the re-integration of the south-eastern region in ‘one Nigeria’ have been criti-
cized by many political analysts. Hence, Nigeria has been described as a ‘forced unity’ 
and a big ‘colonial commercial business structure’, which only profited the colonialists 
(Ebiem, 2011). Nigeria has also been described as a mere ‘colonial contraption and 
complications’ – a creation of the colonialists for their ‘self interest’ (Ojukwu, 2009). 
Arguably, Nigeria is still ‘far from being one’ socially and economically (Ojukwu, 
2009). Socially and politically, there are clear differences between the tribal groups; for 
instance, they speak different languages (about 400) and have highly divergent customs 
and ways of life. They are also at different levels of cultural development (Ojukwu, 
2009; Osuntokun, 1979). According to Nkolika (2007), Nigeria is held together by 
‘nothing except the coercive apparatus of the state’ (p. 1) because it is clear that the 
average Nigerian commits his loyalty more to ethnic sentiment and in-group move-
ments. Ethnic nationalities support the ‘one Nigeria’ political arrangement merely on 
the basis of what they feel they stand to gain from the accumulation syndrome arising 
from oil wealth, and not through any psychological bond or legal identification. Hence, 
whenever any group’s access to the accumulation process is restricted or denied, such 
groups accuse the government of being ‘marginalized’ and threaten to secede (Nkolika, 
2007). Duruji (2009) argues that the resurgence of the post-war Igbo generation is a 
reaction to a continual marginalization and alienation of the Igbo from the Nigerian pol-
ity. Since the civil war, the Nigerian government has adopted socio-political and eco-
nomic policies that consistently and effectively tended to reduce the capacity of the 
Igbo to confront the state (Duruji, 2009). And because Nigeria is a ‘rentier state’ (Jegga, 
2003), where the government is the main recipient of external rent and the rest of soci-
ety is engaged routinely in distribution and utilization rather than production, the rentier 
consumption mentality is created and people simply seek rights to the national ‘cake’. 
Consequently, there is a break in work–reward causation (Jegga, 2003) and well-paid 
political positions are ‘allocated’ rather than merited. Thus, individuals are rewarded 
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and often over-paid for nothing more than loyalty to political parties. Nkolika (2007) 
notes that this has led to allocation of resources in a way that merely satisfies ethnic 
expectations, and also subverted equity and justice. ‘For instance, projects are initiated 
for the wrong reasons and located in places where they are least beneficial . . . The 
immensity of state power and the material benefits accruing from it lead to the over-
evaluation of state power. Every means is considered legitimate to acquire state power 
for the principal reason that those who win (state power) win everything and those who 
lose, lose everything’ (Nkolika, 2007: 4). The struggle for separate existence by some 
ethnic movements or the demand for the creation of more states in Nigeria today is as a 
result of the feeling of denial of rights to state resources (Chiluwa, 2011b).
Today, the Biafran struggle is pursued by a pro-Biafra radicalist movement known 
as the ‘Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra’ (MASSOB), whose activities are 
mostly noticeable on the Internet and discussed on social networking sites. This 
movement still advocates a separate country for the Igbo people and accuses the 
Nigerian state of marginalizing them. MASSOB identifies itself as a peaceful group 
and advertises a 25-stage plan to achieve its goal peacefully (Murray, 2007; Shirbon, 
2006). The activities of MASSOB not only query the citizenship question in Nigeria, 
but have consistently opposed the rationale in the corporate existence of the Nigerian 
state and have indeed created an identity dilemma for the Igbo nation (Nkolika, 2007). 
The MASSOB leader, Raph Uwazuruike, was arrested and detained by the Nigerian 
government in 2005, along with some members of his group, on charges of treason. 
They were granted temporary bail in May 2008. Biafra campaigners in Diaspora, 
especially in the USA and the UK, insist on the actualization of the ‘Sovereign State 
of Biafra’ or ‘the United States of Biafra’. The main body of the campaign group 
claims to maintain subsidiary media affiliates such as Radio Biafra – an online radio 
network, newspapers and magazines, and is also said to have a well-organized and 
influential leadership, which claims to be recognized by the most powerful and important 
countries in the world, with its headquarters in the USA.
Biafra Net (the Biafra network), established by the Biafra Online Campaign Groups 
(BOCG) is a hosting site comprising links to subsidiary websites such as Voice of 
Biafra, Biafra World, Biafra Online, Biafra Forum, MASSOB, Biafra Consortium, 
Biafra Nigeria World (BNW) and the Biafra Liberation Movement (BLM). Their main 
message is to demand the actualization of the defunct state of Biafra through non-
violent means and particularly using social media to make their voices heard. Access 
to any of these websites is strictly by membership. All ‘Biafrans’ (notably the Igbos) 
are advised to register as members and participate in the Biafra forums where members 
engage in important discussions and debates on the actualization of the Biafran state. 
MASSOB and the Biafra campaign groups (e.g. BNW) therefore form a virtual com-
munity, where members not only form social bonding and relationships (Taiwo, 2010), 
but also awaken the consciousness of their common roots and socio-cultural heritage. 
To the ‘Biafrans’, the question of identity, that is ‘who we are’, in the Nigerian state 
becomes paramount in the quest for self-determination and group definition. Therefore, 
rather than provide topic groups as in most discussion forums, the primary topic of 
discussion in the BOCG forums is the actualization of the Biafran dream.
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Previous research on the Biafra campaign groups
Studies in the political and social sciences have identified the causes and management 
of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria, particularly MASSOB and the Biafran online struggle 
(e.g. Badmus, 2006; Ikelegbe, 2005; Nkolika, 2007; Ojukwu, 2009; Salawu, 2010; 
Ukiwo, 2009). Nkolika (2007), among other scholars, attributes the Igbo protests to the 
culmination of feelings of alienation and marginalization, which is construed as a delib-
erate policy of the Nigerian government to exclude the Igbo from political power (see 
also Duruji, 2009; Ojukwu, 2009). According to Ukiwo (2009), state violence against 
ethnic minorities was the main cause of the secessionist attempt by Biafra and this has 
continued to promote ethnic nationalism in contemporary Nigeria. The methods of the 
Biafra protests, according to Nkolika (2007), have been provincial and non-violent, 
characterized mainly by mild petition to the Nigerian government and demanding nego-
tiation for separate existence. Significantly, the MASSOB leadership has consistently 
denounced political violence and has demonstrated its commitment to peaceful means 
in realizing their objectives. This method of non-violence has been attributed to the 
guiding ideology of the MASSOB founder, who studied at an Indian university and was 
influenced by the Gandhi philosophy of non-violence (Omeje, 2005; Ukiwo, 2009). 
Hence, the Biafra campaigners condemn the activities of the militia arm of the group 
and mainly pursue a systematic sensitization of Nigerians and the international com-
munity in regard to the Biafran dream through online social networks. So far, very little 
research has focused on these online activities, despite the fact that the Internet has 
become a dynamic instrument for social mobilization and resistance. Unless a thorough 
study of these online activities is made from a discourse-analytical perspective, rumours 
and speculation will continue to grow and tension will increase around the potential of 
this group and the security implications this might have. A comprehensive sociolinguistic-
oriented CDA of online-based written texts produced and disseminated by the BOCG 
will likely offer some valid linguistic report of Biafra online resistance, which previous 
studies in the social sciences have failed to do. The current research therefore aims to: 
(i) investigate the discourse structure of the Biafra online forums; (ii) examine the 
implications and potential of the resistance and consider whose interest the resistance is 
serving; and (iii) explore lessons and precautions for security in Nigeria.
Sociolinguistic-based CDA
CDA is a type of discourse analysis that ‘aims to contribute to addressing the social 
“wrongs” of the day (in a broad sense – injustice, inequality, lack of freedom, etc.) by 
analysing their sources and causes, resistance to them and possibilities of overcoming 
them’ (Fairclough, 2009: 163). The critical discourse analyst examines how certain sets 
of vocabulary and grammatical structures in texts (e.g. social media texts) reveal value 
judgements and ideological perspectives. Ideology in this context (i.e. social media lan-
guage) includes the ways in which individuals or groups/identities represent themselves 
or are represented by others. The cognitive structure of ideologies reveals that group 
attitudes often lead to positive self-representation and negative other-representation (Van 
Dijk, 2005). This, however, is not limited to the representation and legitimization of class 
domination. Dominated groups also require a form of ideology as a basis for the 
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resistance (Van Dijk, 2005: 25). For example, how do the Biafra campaigners construct 
themselves and what positive representations about their goals are projected? What do 
these kinds of representations suggest about their expectations of public opinion and the 
response of the Nigerian government? The main social function of ideologies therefore 
is ‘the coordination of the social practices of group members for effective realization of 
the goals of a social group and the protection of their interest’ (Van Dijk, 2005: 24). This 
study critically examines the discourse structure of the BOCG forums and how these 
reveal ideologies and value judgements, which may lead to a better understanding of 
the Biafra question, their campaign group activities, and the implications and possible 
consequences of the resistance.
In order to rightly locate the place of Nigerian online discourse in its social context 
and use CDA to address some fundamental questions of virtual community, identity, 
inequality and ideology, a sociolinguistically informed approach, such as that recom-
mended by Blommaert (2005), is in part adopted in the analyses. Blommaert advocates 
a sociolinguistic approach to CDA in order to properly account for globalized contexts of 
language use as the world becomes increasingly more globalized. Hence, key concepts 
such as community, literacy, identity, ideology and ‘voice’ would receive more vigorous 
analyses within the framework of sociolinguistically and anthropologically informed 
discourse analysis. While acknowledging the big roles and practices of the main propo-
nents of CDA (i.e. Fairclough, Van Dijk and Wodak), Blommaert (2005) argues strongly 
in favour of ‘forgotten contexts’, which goes beyond the here and now of discourse to the 
social, political, historical and cultural conditions that informed the production of the 
text. In other words, a globalized approach to CDA will not only pay attention to the real 
time of the discourse situation, but also to the historical layers of context, both visible 
and invisible to the participants in that moment (Thorborrow, 2007).
The term ‘computer-mediated discourse’ (CMD) (Herring, 2001) has in itself impor-
tant implications for the theory and methodology in computer-mediated communication 
(CMC) research from a sociolinguistic viewpoint (Androutsopoulos, 2006: 421). The 
notion of online/virtual community, for instance, is very helpful in theorizing the social 
context of computer-mediated language practices and the need to apply sociolinguistic 
methods in CMD (Androutsopoulos, 2006). The virtual community reveals other socio-
linguistic parameters such as language variation, social interaction and identity that are 
fundamental to CMD research. As we shall see in this study, the notion of online/virtual 
community has been given several definitions – for example, as a group of people who 
interact in a virtual environment which, however, must interact regularly around a shared 
norm and have a sense of common history and an awareness of difference from other 
people (Androutsopoulos, 2006: 422). In this study, I examine how the BOCG constitute 
a virtual community or virtual communities and how the group(s) negotiate their identity 
and provide sociability, support and identity to their members (Herring, 2004: 346), as 
they engage in social interactions in the online forums.
The corpus
The corpus for this study comprises mainly text-based downloads from MASSOB web-
sites and other websites connected to the BOCG. Data are obtained mainly from 
MASSOB, and the BOCG discussion forums such as BNW and the Biafra Actualization 
224 Discourse & Society 23(3)
Forum (BAF). On the whole, a total of 250 posts were sampled, out of which 87 were 
analysed in this research. They are numbered P1 to P87, ‘P’ standing for ‘Post’. The 87 
posts covered the key topics of all 250 posts dealing with the main concerns of the 
Biafran liberation struggle. Many of the 250 posts overlap in content; in fact some are 
almost a repetition of previous posts. The posts that are too closely related are combined 
and considered as one in the data. Posts that are occasional diversionary gossips and 
jokes are excluded. Thus, the 87 analysed posts are those considered as clearly revealing 
the sociolinguistic character of digital discourse, reflecting virtual community, social inter-
action, language structure and ideology. However, given the limited space of this article, I 
will pay more attention to language and discourse structures in the analysis.
BOCG as a virtual community
The traditional view of a ‘community’ is that of a people within geographical boundaries 
with some racial bond and common historical and socio-cultural identity. People in a 
community often speak the same language and sometimes exhibit cultural traits. A vir-
tual community (Rheingold, 1993), or communities, however, is dispersed geographi-
cally, though some online communities are linked geographically and are known as 
community websites.2 Virtual communities resemble real-life communities in the sense 
that they are both made up of people and provide support, information and friendship for 
members (Wellman, 1999). Internet-based virtual/online communities have been used by 
social or professional groups to pursue certain goals and interests, which tends to lay to 
rest the concern of early researchers about the reality of media-based communities, that 
is whether communities could actually exist through the media.3 As it stands today, 
online communities are as real as, and function almost as if they were, the offline com-
munity. Hence, a virtual or online community may be described as the gathering of peo-
ple in an online ‘space’, where they come to communicate, interact, connect and have the 
tendency to know each other better over time.4 According to Rheingold (1993), virtual 
communities form when people carry on public discussions long enough and with ‘suf-
ficient human feeling’, to form webs of personal relationships. This appears to corrobo-
rate with the view that virtual communities may not integrate much of our real life, but 
will certainly affect our emotions and sometimes our thinking and opinions.5 Given the 
serious social and cultural roles of virtual communities in recent times, Androutsopoulos 
(2006) recommends that a virtual community should interact regularly, around a shared 
interest or purpose, with the development of clearly defined social roles, hierarchies and 
shared norms; these would anchor on a sense of common history and awareness of dif-
ference from other groups. Relating this understanding to the roles of the BOCG, it is 
clear that these groups identify with the common history of their members, most of 
whom are Igbos. And they share the history of the civil war as main actors and are 
viewed as ‘rebels’ who now see themselves as suffering from generational punishment in 
the form of economic denials and social exclusion. Their common interest is the sensiti-
zation and mobilization of Igbo youths towards the ultimate goal of the realization of the 
defunct Biafra nation.
Biafra World, Biafra Forum and BNW hosted by the BOCG operate as Internet 
Message Boards (IMBs) or discussion forums where members regularly update personal 
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journals, publish and share fresh ideas, and respond to posts by other members. Some of 
the posts are media reports culled from offline newspapers or magazines. As is the case 
with the Arab world, these trends are increasingly seen in regions of the world where 
violent conflict is ongoing or imminent. Like the more conventional media, the online 
discourse that is created through blogs and other digital media can serve as a powerful 
information source within conflict zones, while helping to frame our own understanding 
of these conflicts (Whitaker and Varghese, 2009). The posts below (P3–P6) from the 
BNW exemplify the type of communication that takes place in BOCG’s virtual commu-
nity websites. In addition to the more complex issues of the online struggle, these exam-
ples sound very much like chat-room interactions among friends and equals.
P3. (Okwy). It amuses me when i read that ‘okwyonwuka’ lies, if this is the way to lie, i assume 
the title of a champion. Truth is the greatest vindicator and i am on the side of truth so i am not 
deterred with false accusation. After a brief absence in this forum, my first post was started with 
the ‘thank God i am able to post in this forum again’ phrase.
P4. (Joy). I made my correspondence with the right person and have no more apologies on that. 
If my private discussion is now for public consumption, i am sorry, i can’t help it.
P5. (Greg). Your advice is noted. However, this is not a one way responsibility, i think MeBiafra 
understands me too, may be a joke taken too far, so let appeasement start from the first offender. 
It’s never my intention to drag your name to this issue; i think i am capable of defending my 
self on what i know i am right. Though, i appreciate your intervention.
P6. (Al). I still stand on my intention of starting this thread; my take is that the acrimony toward 
Dim Ojukwu here is unjustifiable. He likened the second coming of Christ to the realisation of 
the Biafran dream, stating that at a time people least expect, the much sought Biafra would be 
a reality. (Rev. Fr. Cornelius Ezeiloaku, posted 9 March 2005, 10.06 p.m.)
The above posts show that the forums are interactive where responses to a post appear 
as ‘comments’. The above examples also show that the topic under discussion is ongoing 
and participants respond to previous comments. Members not only agree on certain 
issues, they also disagree and, in fact, quarrel and exchange bitter words; some even 
trade insults. In such cases, other concerned members of the discussion groups would 
naturally mediate and restore understanding. P3 above shows that someone had felt he 
was misunderstood but maintains his position, which he views as the ‘truth’. In the 
forums, concerned members take a neutral position to solicit peace and forgiveness from 
the aggrieved parties. P15 and P16 below are good examples.
P15. Guys, 
Please go to neutral corners and let this thing die a natural death. Remember, to forgive is 
divine. (The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves. . .)
P16. If we are not careful, we’ll all get distracted away from the main aim of this forum. Let 
bygones be bygones please. There are greater battles to be fought.
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These conversational exchanges, though not strictly on the Biafran online struggle, 
demonstrate the interactional nature of the BOCG forums as a virtual community that 
promotes information sharing, collaboration and exchange of ideas and feelings.
Language structure
Previous studies of the linguistic structure of CMD have argued that computer-mediated 
language is less standard, less complex and less coherent than standard written language 
(Herring, 2001). According to Crystal (2006: 244), the language style of the web is dif-
ficult to describe because it ‘falls uneasily between standard and non-standard English’. 
Some of the samples indeed illustrate writings that are largely orthodox in terms of 
spelling, punctuation and grammar but ‘depart from the norm in various ways’ (p. 244).
As regard grammar, stretches of text defy conventional analysis in terms of sentences. The 
discourse expresses a sequence of units of thought, but these do not correspond to the kinds of 
sentence division we have been taught to associate with ‘elegant’ writing. At lower levels of 
grammar, too, there are features which would be considered unacceptable in traditional printed 
publications. (Crystal, 2006: 244–245)
However, Crystal (2011) concludes that Internet language combines features of 
speech exchanges and written communication. For instance, many words and con-
structions are characteristic of contracted forms; lengthy coordinated sentences are 
normal, and are often of considerable complexity. We also have ‘nonsense vocabu-
lary’, obscenity and slang. Writing displays different characteristics, such as multiple 
instances of subordination, elaborately balanced syntactic patterns and items of vocab-
ulary that are never spoken (e.g. names of chemical compounds) (2011: 18). 
Unconventional orthography also results when textual representation of auditory infor-
mation such as prosody, laughter and other non-language sounds become necessary 
(Herring, 2001). In some cases, emoticons (e.g. a smiley face) are used to express 
emotions. Herring argues that only a relatively small percentage of non-standard lin-
guistic features in CMD are intentional, rather the majority are deliberate choices made 
by users in order to economize space, mimic spoken language features or express 
themselves creatively (p. 617). While the real-time synchronous medium (e.g. Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC)) tends to be more unpredictable, due to the fact that it more fre-
quently illustrates features of oral language, text-based asynchronous CMD (e.g. 
emails, blogs or discussion forums) enables users to take their time to construct and 
edit their messages. As Herring (2001) also observes, variation in structural com-
plexity in emails, blogs or discussion forums must be understood as reflecting social 
situational factors, which determine what level of formality (and with it standardiza-
tion) and structural complexity are appropriate to the context. Unlike email, however, 
language forms in blogs and discussion forums are less complex and combine fea-
tures of both written and spoken language. Chiluwa (2011c), for example, shows that 
Nigerian participants in an online political discussion forum reflect various levels of 
English language proficiency, and that language variations are much more based on 
linguistic choices of the participants rather than on English proficiency.
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In the BOCG forums, most of the posts clearly reflect features of Standard American 
or British English. Language structures are complex, mostly with standard syntactic pat-
terns. This is not surprising because the majority of the Biafra online campaigners live in 
Europe and North America. However, there are no features of Americanisms in their use 
of English. Words are carefully chosen and features that betray spoken language are 
highly minimized. In most of the posts (e.g. P3, P4, P5 and P6), formal language forms 
are used in interactions that were supposed to be informal, even in arguments. Expressions 
such as ‘truth is the greatest vindicator and I am on the side of truth, so I am not deterred 
with false accusation’ in P3, and a response like ‘I made my correspondence with the 
right person and have no apologies for that . . .’ in P4 sound rather formal and bookish. 
The formality of language use in the BOCG forums is attributable not only to the fact that 
written communication tends to be more formal than spoken, but also to the overriding 
theme and context of online activism. Political discourse, which the online forums are 
engaged in, is generally formal, even when written to be spoken. Some of the posts tend 
to be formal also because they are a reflection of online journalism; a number of the posts 
are actually published newspaper reports from the local press. Another important reason 
for the formality of language use in the forums is that the variety of English in the posts 
is partly a manifestation of Nigerian English (NigE). Standard Nigerian English tends to 
be formal and bookish (cf. Chiluwa, 2010a). Despite the American influence, many of 
the participants still write in Nigerian English. Chiluwa (2010b, 2011c) also notes that 
language use in Nigerian online forums demonstrates intra-group CMD, showing the use 
of discursive strategies that reflect ethnic and national identity. These include culture-
specific words, names and verbal genres that are particularly Nigerian. Others are codes-
witching, coinages and Nigerianisms.
Codeswitching and coinages in the posts
Nigeria is a multilingual speech community with about 400 languages (Adegbija, 1997), 
spoken across its multi-ethnic communities. Thus, an average Nigerian is a bilingual, 
speaking English (or a version of English) and at least a native language. On the Internet, 
therefore, language use by Nigerians reveals features of multilingualism or some forms of 
codeswitching, showing the ethnic/linguistic orientation of the user. This further shows 
that language choice online depends largely on the socio-cultural context of the user. 
Since most of the Biafra campaigners are educated bilinguals/multilinguals, they use 
English and codeswitch infrequently in Igbo. English is the language of choice, especially 
as one of the main objectives of the campaigns is to educate the international community 
with the message and situation of the Biafran Igbos. In the BOCG websites and forums, 
English is used with an occasional switch to Igbo, mainly in the opening and closing of 
messages. It is also used in ethnic labels, slogans and generic names. Occasionally, it is 
used to describe God, or to express proverbs/local idioms. An ethnic label like ‘Ndigbo’ 
(or NdIgbo) is used as a sign of solidarity or ethnic identification.
There are three types of opening illustrated in the following samples. First is the group 
solidarity address, for example ‘Umu Biafra’ (P34) (Biafrans or children of Biafra). This 
is similar to ‘Umu Igbo’ (P66) (Igbos or children of the Igbo). Second is the greeting, for 
example ‘Igbo mma mma nu’ (P64). This does not have a direct English equivalent but 
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stands for ‘Igbo I greet you’. The third form of opening is divided into a formal address, 
for example ‘Mazi Ray’ (Mr Ray) (P67), and an informal address, for example Nwanna 
Dave (P65) (my brother Dave). Most of the posts begin informally with the addressee’s 
first name, especially where a post is a comment to a previous message by a member of 
the forum. Codeswitching in these examples reinforces cultural meaning and the aesthet-
ics of the local language. The greeting form in P64 captures local thought which lacks a 
direct English counterpart, thereby restoring the sense of tradition of the Igbo.
P34. Umu Biafra, 
The fact of the food poisoning for the Biafran masses should serve as a wake up call for Biafrans 
to attend the 2006 Bianfran Conference in Toronto, Canada. Orula mgbe anyi ji awa anya! 
Onye ujo abiala nga anyi na-awa anya!! Forward Ever!!! Backward Never!!!! (Fada Jon, posted 
10 July 2006, 06.13 p.m.)
P64. Igbo mma mma nu, 
It is one thing to point fingers and another to put out MONEY where our mouth is and do the 
dirty work. . .
P65. Nwanna Dave, 
With out attempt to derail the ongoing issue, may i disagree with the above statement.
P66. Umu Igbo, 
The people like Oha ka and his organization who make financial gain from the unfortunate 
situation Nd’Igbo find themselves are like carpetbaggers and can be said to be worse than the 
oppressors.
P67. Mazi Ray.
(posted 17 April 2007, 02.23 p.m.)
About 85% of the posts end with the slogan ‘Hail Biafra’, sometimes with an accom-
panying emoticon (smiley face) as in P68, or showing disgust/surprise as in P69. A few 
others end with ‘In Aburi we stand’ or ‘Biafra for’ life. P73 below ends with a slogan 
‘Igbo gadi’ (long live Igbo). But, significantly, a few others end with proverbs or local 
idioms that necessitate codeswitching, especially where the pragmatics of the local 
expression become crucial. For example, ‘tufiakwa’ in P59 cannot possibly be rendered 
in English and is better said in Igbo. This kind of expression is used to express extreme 
disgust, equivalent to ‘God forbid!’
P59. Those who blindlessly follow any individual no matter who they are or place individuals 
above any nation will end up with eggs on their faces – TUFIAKWA!!!!
P68. Hail Biafra.   
P69. WASHINGTON – A Northwest Airline passenger bound to Detroit boarded KLM airline 
from Nigeria to Amsterdam, who said he was acting on al-Qaeda’s instructions, tried to blow 
up the plane Friday as it was landing in Detroit, law enforcement and national security officials 
said. Passengers subdued the man and may have prevented him from detonating the explosives, 
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the officials said. ‘We believe this was an attempted act of terrorism’, a White House official 
said. Federal officials imposed stricter screening measures after the incident. His name is 
UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALLAB FROM NORTHERN NIGERIA. King said the 
flight began via KLM in Nigeria and went through Amsterdam en route to Detroit. There were 
278 passengers aboard the Airbus 330. Yep that name sound very familiar, he is from Islamic 
Republic of Northern Nigeria that is, the future habitat and sleeper cell for Moslem terrorists.  
Hail Biafra.
P70 below ends with a proverb: ‘ofu onye ana asi unu abia go’ (one person does not 
say ‘welcome all’). This proverb implies that one person does not take a decision for 
everyone. A similar closing/sign-off is in P71, which contains ‘udo ga adi’. Though a 
local adage that simply means ‘there will be peace’, it is not usually said in English, even 
when the speaker is speaking English as the primary code. This means that ‘udo ga adi’ 
is traditionally heavier than ‘there will be peace’. In the context of Biafran discourse, this 
expression envisions hope for the Biafra actualization. P28 ends with a prayer: ‘Chukwu 
gozie Igbo’ (God bless Igbo), ‘Chukwu gozie New Biafra’ (God bless the new Biafra). 
God is described as ‘Ama ama amasi amasi’ (the Omniscient). In this context, prayer in 
the local language is probably perceived as more potent than prayer in English. Also, the 
attribute of God as ‘omniscient’ is perhaps not as weighty as the Igbo equivalent which 
literally means ‘the knower, whose knowledge never ends’.
P28. But as usual our God ‘AMA AMA AMASI AMASI’ has and will continue to confound 
them! Chukwu gozie Igbo. Chukwu gozie New Biafra. . .
P70. Feel me? Ofu onye ana asi unu abia go. (Ednut Igbo-American, posted 23 April 2007, 
07.40 p.m.)
P71. Udo ga adi. (posted 29 April 2007, 12.06 a.m.)
P72. Nwa Asaba.
P73. Igbo Gadi.
‘Nwa Asaba’ (son of Asaba) in P72 is used as a sign-off, just as it may as well serve 
as an opening if someone is responding to this particular post (e.g. P65). Again, ‘Nwa 
Asaba’ is not usually rendered in English during Igbo traditional discourse. So, certain 
expressions are better said in the local code, otherwise some levels of meaning or culture 
will be lost in an attempt to render them in English.
Other forms of codeswitching are still within sentence boundaries but are part of the 
content of the message. In P42, for example, ‘ozo emena my people’ (line 4) expresses a 
wish, i.e. ‘may it never happen again’, referring to the horrors of the civil war. ‘Ozo 
emena’ is often used as a personal name among the Igbos, often in families that experi-
enced deaths or tragedies shortly before the birth of a child. This local term better 
expresses the Igbo psychology, especially their traditional sense of tragedy and loss. The 
writer of P42 counsels against the repeat of the Biafran war in their quest for self-
determination. He further supports his argument with an adage – ‘umunna bu ike’ (line 5), 
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meaning ‘brotherhood is power’ or ‘united we stand’. He believes that division among 
the various campaign groups inevitably endangers the Biafran course. There has been 
evidence of friction and fragmentation among the various campaign groups.
P42. I’m glad Biafra Nigeria world message board has come into existence. I am a Biafran 
through and through; it is time something is done to free people like Ralph who have the bottle 
to say things everyone wants to say. But no matter what, let’s not go back to those horrible thirty 
months of hell. Ozo emena my people, but we could overcome through a peaceful way like 
Ralph, but we also should remember that umunna bu ike united we stand and divided we fall 
like we did the last time around. (Frank O, posted 2 August 2007, 4.12 p.m.)
A similar instance of codeswitching, illustrating culture-specific meaning, has been 
examined in P34 above, where the writer switches to the local code to render a war song, 
which says: Orula mgbe anyi ji awa anya! Onye ujo abiala nga anyi na-awa anya (It is 
time to act like warriors; the fearful should not approach when we act like warriors). The 
song functions as a call to defend the Igbo nation against its enemies. This post was 
among several others that responded to the report of an alleged fish poisoning that was 
said to be targeted at the Igbo population in south-eastern Nigeria. Apart from code-
switching, coinage is another instance of language use in the BOCG forums. This also 
includes peculiar Nigerian usages. There are a very few instances of this in the corpus 
and they are worth mentioning here. In P54 below, for example, there is a codeswitch: ‘if 
you must speak for oha. . .’ (line 2). (‘Oha’ in Igbo means ‘the majority’ or ‘everyone’.) 
In line 4, there is a coinage adapted from ‘oha’, that is ‘ohacracy’ derived from ‘democ-
racy’. The Biafran brand of democracy, which the writer defines as ‘majority’ rule, is 
better captured in the Igbo-based coinage ‘ohacracy’, which is indeed the true democ-
racy. It is rule by everyone.
P54. I care that only three people based in Chicago are pretending to speak for the Igbo nation. 
Another definition of democracy is Majority Rule. If you must speak for Oha, it is only 
reasonable to expect that you enjoy the backing of the majority of oha especially when you are 
expostulating on Ohacracy. If you scroll up you will read where Oha-ka addressed the Igbo 
nation as a nation of cowards. . .
Discourse structure
Discourses that enact inequality, for instance, often reflect ideological opinions and atti-
tudes that are born out of mental models. Mental models can be personal or collective, 
that is those shared with members of a group. Both types of cognition influence interaction 
or discourse of individual members, while shared social representation governs the 
actions of such a group (Van Dijk, 2001). In the analysis of discourse structures in this 
section, some dimensions of discourse such as propositions, presuppositions and impli-
cations are examined in order to see how these reveal the ideology of the perceived 
dominated group. I have attempted to examine how certain items of vocabulary, gram-
matical and semantic structures, story structures and the overall topics of the posts con-
vey ideological biases in favour of the Biafra campaign groups. In this context, the 
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BOCG are the ‘Us’ and ‘We’ with positive in-group representations, while Nigeria and 
the Nigerian government are ‘Them’ with the negative other-representation. We must not 
forget that dominated groups (e.g. BOCG) project their own ideology in order to prop-
erly articulate their goal and establish the basis for their resistance (Van Dijk, 2005). In 
this way, they act through their members to sustain their position.
Propositions
Propositions are arguments often embodying opinions or value judgements that are put 
forward to strengthen or protect one’s position. They contain grammatical items that 
modify them (arguments) to make them sound more forceful, severe or mitigated. For 
instance, ‘Nigerian cowards’ or ‘brave Biafrans’ are value judgements that portray 
Nigeria and Biafra as either acceptable or condemnable to the reader, depending on 
whose side the reader belongs. Ideological representations are more visible when cer-
tain propositions stress positive actions of the ‘we’ in-group and negative actions of the 
‘they’ out-group. This illustrates Van Dijk’s ‘ideological square’: (i) emphasize our 
good properties/actions; (ii) emphasize their bad properties/actions; (iii) mitigate our 
bad properties/actions; (iv) mitigate their good properties/actions (Van Dijk, 1998: 33).
This strategy of ideological self-interest appears in the discourse of the campaign 
groups in relation to Nigeria. This is first articulated in Ojukwu’s description of Nigeria 
in the Ahiara Declaration,6 and was clearly expressed in the choice of lexical items that 
explicitly and implicitly reveal positive and negative evaluations. For instance, Ojukwu 
consistently refers to Nigeria as the ‘enemy’. This, of course, is expected in a war situa-
tion, where one warring side is automatically the enemy of the other. In this situation 
also, the ‘war’ is fought both militarily and verbally. Nigeria was said to have ‘diabolical 
intentions’ and was sponsored by ‘wicked mentors’, such as Britain. On the other hand, 
‘our guerrillas’ (i.e. Biafran soldiers) did ‘magnificent works of harassing the enemy’. 
The activities of the Nigerian military were also generally (expected to be) represented 
negatively by Ojukwu. For example, the ‘proud Biafrans’ contained the ‘cowardly air 
raids on civilians’ by the Nigerian Air Force and, for a period of two years, the ‘defence-
less and weak’ Biafrans withstood an ‘enemy unequalled in viciousness’, who embarked 
on ‘a crime of genocide against our people’. Nigeria and her foreign collaborators were 
‘our enemies’ whose ‘false and ill-motivated propaganda’ beclouded the real issues of 
the war. However, the Biafran position was ‘our struggle’, which was a ‘total and vehe-
ment rejection of all those evils which blighted Nigeria, evils which were bound to lead 
to the disintegration of that ill-fated federation’. Throughout the Ahiara Declaration, 
ideological propositions portrayed Nigeria as evil and as the aggressors, while the 
Biafrans were progressives, mainly fighting as the only option for survival.
Following the same propositional pattern, the campaign group members maintained 
the positive in-group representation and the negative out-group representation in the 
posts. In some of the posts, Nigeria is frequently referred to as ‘a failed state’, ‘the British 
contraption’ or ‘Islamic Republic of Nigeria’, etc. (such as in P74). Notice that the 
Biafrans are referred to as ‘proud Igbo Biafrans’ in P74; this is very similar to the mode 
of address for the same people in the Ahiara Declaration.
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P74. Proud Igbo-Biafrans: 
I feel proud to be an Igbo-Biafran. And I am very proud of our fathers, uncles, mothers and all 
who contributed to the Biafran effort. But for the British, Russia and the Arab world who gave 
massive military and diplomatic support to the British contraption called Nigeria, Biafra would 
have survived and the Ahiara Declaration would have been used to build a modern model 
African State . . . One thing I noticed in the Ahiara Declaration is that the failed state called 
Nigeria has borrowed ideas in that document under various guises. However, it has not worked 
for them because they have no regards for meritocracy. . . (Icheoku, advocate, posted 1 June 
2009, 7.06 p.m.)
P75. Nigerians call it Igbo made, some will say cheap labor or imitation of arts but to the Igbos, 
it fulfills the need of a common man and eliminates the middle man. The Igbos sees it as their 
greatest element of strength, the great substantial interest on which Nigeria over looked. Igbo 
made is an account of intelligent, manly, progress, independent, thinking and acting for the best 
interest of Nigeria, earning it’s own wages, accumulating those wages into capital, education 
and claiming the right of effective franchise and helping to unbleached the fabric of the State 
called Nigeria as an asshole nation with no vision, despite their ingenuity, Nigeria remains 
dumb and dumber. A university in Eastern Nigeria offers Chinese language to understand more 
about made in China because the Chinese are coming and they are coming for the common man 
in spite of the West. Here comes the Chinese. (Waypoint1 Biafra, posted 12 January 2006, 
10.56 p.m.)
In P74 and P75 above, the economic and creative activities of the Igbo are empha-
sized, while the bad actions attributed to the ‘Islamic Republic of Nigeria’ (e.g. an 
attempted terrorist attack on a US airliner) are emphasized (e.g. P69). Nigeria is described 
in P75 as ‘an asshole nation with no vision’ and it remains ‘dumb and dumber’, while the 
Igbos are ‘intelligent, manly, independent, thinking and acting. . .’ In order to maximize 
out-group bad actions and minimize in-group negative aspects, some of the members of 
the BOCG post media reports that chronicle brazen victimization and murder of Igbos by 
the Nigerian police. One such report (e.g. P76) written by one Caroline Duffield of the 
BBC claimed that some Igbo youths were killed by the police. The killings were described 
as ‘mindless slaughters’ and ‘murderous, criminal and genocidal’. In the same report, 
‘Biafran youth’ were referred to as ‘helpless people’. Nigeria was also accused of illegal 
killings of MASSOB members in P35 and P36 above. P35 was a ‘press release’ by 
MASSOB, while P36 was a post originally published by the ‘world-wide coalition of 
Biafra org. . .’ The two posts chronicled these killings. P35, for instance, alleged that 
armed soldiers were ‘dispatched’ to the home town of the MASSOB leader, where 
MASSOB members were holding their meeting. The soldiers were said to have shot 
‘indiscriminately’, resulting in the deaths of 34 people after the ‘heavy, war-like firings’. 
P36 also accused the Obasanjo government of ‘unprovoked brutality’ against MASSOB 
members. While the group re-emphasized their commitment to non-violence, they, how-
ever, threatened to ‘defend’ themselves against further police harassment and killings. 
The posts ended with ‘to be forewarned is to be forearmed’. In the two posts, Nigerians 
(the ‘Other’) were the killers, while MASSOB and the BOCG were the non-violent and 
the killed. However, that the soldiers were ‘dispatched’ presupposes that an established 
authority or government must have sent them and that the military attacks on civilians 
was a deliberate action of the state. Whether these reports were confirmed or not again 
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presupposes that certain attacks must have been carried out against MASSOB members. 
A report by the Human Rights Watch in 2009 (in P37), for example, confirms that the 
Nigerian government indeed had a record of human rights violations, with the state secu-
rity forces responsible for extra-judicial killings and torture. On the other hand, the threat 
issued by MASSOB to defend itself against police harassment appears contradictory to 
its principle of non-violence. The statement ‘these brutalities should not be seen as weak-
ness: to be forewarned is to be forearmed’ actually implies that the group is capable of 
violent retaliation, which goes to confirm that MASSOB indeed operates an armed mili-
tia. The group has repeatedly refuted accusations of violence and kidnapping committed 
by its members. The warning certainly suggests that MASSOB members cannot possibly 
confront armed soldiers or policemen without being armed themselves.
In another report attributed to CNN, 84 Nigerian children were said to have died after 
ingesting a poisonous teething medicine. While the purported CNN report did not dif-
ferentiate the children that died, a version of the same report posted in a BOCG forum 
claimed that ‘84 Biafra-Nigerian children’ died; ‘Biafra’ was topicalized in the heading 
of the post (i.e. P77).
P76. A Nigerian hospital has told the BBC it is overwhelmed by the number of corpses being 
brought to them by police. The Nigeria Police mindlessly slaughters Biafran youth, at will; 
there is no accountability; there is no stopping this murderous, criminal and genocidal Agency 
of the Nigerian Government, and the people are helpless. The Chief Medical Director at the 
University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital in Enugu says his staff are being forced to carry out 
mass burials. The BBC has established that at least seven people were last seen alive in police 
custody, accused of kidnapping . . . Nigeria’s police have faced strong criticism from human 
rights groups for carrying out extrajudicial and arbitrary killings. Amnesty international is 
presenting the results of a three-year investigation on Wednesday, in which they will describe 
the level of police killings as shocking. The BBC has visited the morgue and taken photographs. 
The images are disturbing. They show piles of young men, lying on top of one another and 
strewn about on tables and floors. In places the corpses are stacked four or five deep. Records 
show 75 corpses were delivered to the morgue by police between June and 26 November this 
year. The Chief Medical Director of the hospital, Dr Anthony Mbah, says his staff were forced 
to carry out a mass burial of between 70 and 80 bodies some weeks ago. He says that another 
mass burial is planned to take place soon. (Caroline Duffield, BBC News, Lagos, Tuesday, 8 
December 2009)
P77. 84 Biafra-Nigeria children die of medicine from antifreeze
LAGOS, Nigeria (CNN) – At least 84 Nigerian children have died after ingesting teething 
medicine that contained a solvent typically found in antifreeze, the country’s health minister 
said Friday. Some 111 babies and children have been sickened since November by the tainted 
batch of My Pikin, which was found to contain diethylene glycol, which is used in some 
antifreeze and brake fluid…
By topicalizing ‘Biafra’ in the heading and portraying them as victims of deliberate 
neglect by Nigeria’s ‘Food and Drug Administration’, the bad actions of Nigeria 
are maximized, while their good actions are minimized or completely covered up. In the 
entire corpus, the actions and activities of the Nigerian presidents and government are 
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frequently criticized in the forums. P78 below is an example of where the late Nigerian 
president came under such attacks; he was accused of attending a meeting in Saudi 
Arabia instead of a United Nations (UN) meeting. This implies that he considered a 
trivial meeting of Islamic nations, such as the opening of a college, more important than 
a UN meeting. Thus, the actions of an enemy nation (Nigeria) are reflected on in the 
action of its presidents.
P78. The President of Islamic Republic of Northern Nigeria for the second time did not attend 
the UN meeting; instead, he flew to Saudi Arabia as a guest at the opening of a University of 
Science and Technology. Guess what? He was not received by the King of Arabia, rather by a 
Governor. And I ask; why would a President of a country choose to ignore his influence in the 
center of the world to attend a meeting in a dusty Island? Even thou Gaddafi and the satanic 
terror of Iran attended. Nigeria, what a country? Hail Biafra. (Supreme advocate)
P79. What a Country. The President of Islamic Republic of Northern Nigeria issued a statement 
in Hausa and English not to the people of Nigeria but to British Press that he is alive and well, 
recovering and will soon be home. He did not set a date to be home, and he did not address the 
Nigerian people about issues that affect them, instead he issued a statement to foreign country. 
Yep, Born to rule, Nigerians are beginning to see the worst of it. What a country? Hail Biafra. 
(Waypoint1)
The late Yar’Adua was also accused of disrespecting Nigerians when he kept silent 
over the state of his health while he remained in Saudi Arabia for medical care. Later, 
rather than address Nigerians when his long absence had already generated much contro-
versy, he addressed the British press (P79). The writer of P79 interpreted this action as a 
slight on Nigerians. The actions and activities of public officers, especially Igbos in the 
Nigerian government, were also constructed negatively. In P80, for instance, a former 
Minister of Information was criticized for attempting to defend Nigeria against foreign 
misrepresentation. While the Minister had argued that Nigeria was not a terrorist state, 
the writer of P80 maintained that Nigeria was indeed a terrorist nation, citing the killing 
of his relative by a northerner as an example. The Minister’s defence of Nigeria was 
described as ‘shameless’. Thus, the activities and policies of the Nigerian government 
were consistently negatively highlighted and often misinterpreted. This tends to buttress 
Van Dijk’s ideological square, for example ‘emphasize their bad properties/actions’. The 
actions of Nigerian politicians, such as corruption, financial scandals and political fraud, 
were freely emphasized and thematized in the posts.
P80. There is something wrong to watch Dora Akumyili shamelessly declare to the world that 
Nigeria is alien to terrorism, the truth is that a member of her community or even her kindred 
most have been killed by Northern Nigerian Islamic terrorists. Yes, my cousin was hacked 
down at the prime of his teenage age by one mallam, nothing happened. Whenever the northern 
oligarchy finds themselves boxed to the corner, it’s never hard to find Igbo fools who would 
volunteer their own life defend their masters to an extend they may not defend their own 
mothers. Akumyili should shut up and allow the terror architects to defend themselves.
Positive in-group representation and negative other-representation in the posts became 
more intense after a northern Nigerian youth attempted to blow up a US aircraft in Detroit 
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in December 2010 (P69). The BOCG became more vocal in their dissociation from the 
terrorist act and, indeed, from Nigeria. The northerners were consistently constructed as 
‘the Muslims’ and the ‘terrorists’, who were not different from Yemeni or Egyptian ter-
rorists. In P81 below, they are called ‘the jihadists’, who are ‘cold-blooded murderers of 
innocent men, women and children’. They are also referred to as ‘pompous idiots’. The 
southerners are the Christians and good people. They are also ‘the pro Judio’ and the 
‘free people’ (P13). The writer of the posts, however, failed to acknowledge that many 
southerners still live in northern Nigeria. Singling out the northern Muslims as terrorists 
also failed to recognize that Islam is practised in the south and that some southern 
Christians still convert to Islam. As a matter of fact, this kind of ideological profiling of 
all northern Nigerian Muslims as terrorists lacks direct connection with the Biafran lib-
eration, rather individuals’ advocacy, especially Diaspora Nigerian southerners who bet-
ter understand the meaning of ‘profiling’ and the kind of harassment Nigerians go 
through at airports and immigration points. The campaigners may actually be protecting 
their own interests abroad, rather than the Biafran cause. It is even doubtful that Igbos in 
Diaspora are ready to return to Nigeria to advocate for the Biafran liberation, which 
would be more practical than merely using foul language against northerners on the 
Internet.
P81. It would seem that the Jihadists of the North have given a bad name (as if it wasn’t bad 
enough already) to all who live in what is called Nigeria. Something must be done to show the 
world that Igbo people are not Muslim jihadists, and are not cold-blooded murderers of innocent 
men, women and children like these people from the north. The sad part is that the world is 
ignorant of these differences. O what irony! that the Brits hand-delivered the oil wealth to the 
very people that would terrorize their population in time to come . . . and that the Americans 
would have to suffer and clean up the bloody mess these pompous idiots caused the whole world.
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves. . . (Greg, Supreme advocate)
Similar to the argument put forward by the writer of P80 above, many of the posts that 
reacted to the attempted terrorist attack on the US aircraft maintained that Nigeria is a ter-
rorist nation. This kind of proposition, coming from Nigerians at a time when the country 
was being profiled by the USA as terrorist, is not only insightful of the kind of discursive 
strategies that are employed in the posts, but shows an extreme form of negative other-
representation. By denouncing Nigeria as a terrorist nation, they are pragmatically advo-
cating a stiff sanction against the country for a crime committed by one man. In this 
context, Umar Farouk Mutalabi (the terrorist) becomes the symbol and ideology of the 
entire north of Nigeria. This is simply not true. In P82, the writer once again argues that 
the solution to the northern and southern amalgamation is to divide the country. He argues 
that the continual existence of Nigeria as one nation only serves the interest of European 
sponsors, for example Britain and its ‘unlimited access to oil in the Christian south’.
P82. Nigeria is a terror sponsor state and should be branded as such, calling Nigeria a place of 
interest at this moment despite the fact the Nigerian oligarchy has not and will never condemn 
terrorism is absurd, an action the western authorities will defiantly regret on the long run. These 
people live and thrive in terror, killing Christians for them is like watching a baseball match in 
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America. The Obama administration has the duty to inform the American public of the truth 
about Nigeria. He must encourage Gordon Brown to loosen the conspiracy of the British 
government and the Nigeria northern oligarchy to hold on to power by means of terrorism and 
in turn, allow Britain unlimited access to oil in the Christian South. It’s now down to oil money 
or American lives. DIVIDE NIGERIA AND MICRO MANAGE THE TERRORIST NORTH. 
(Ikenga Iguedo)
The discourse of the BOCG in the posts clearly illustrates propositions that reveal 
positive evaluations of ‘Us’ (the BOCG) and negative representation of ‘Them’ 
(Nigeria and the Nigerian government). The bad actions of Nigeria are emphasized and 
interpreted as it suits the interpreters, while the bad actions of the BOCG are mini-
mized. In fact, bad properties of the Biafra campaigners are not mentioned at all in the 
posts. The Christian south is consistently constructed as ‘peaceful’ and good, while 
the Moslem north is constructed as violent and terrorist. Cases of violence and social 
crises, such as the Niger Delta insurgency, kidnapping and ethnic violence that have 
been recurrent in the ‘peaceful Christian south’, are not emphasized at all.
Presuppositions and implications
As already highlighted in some of the few examples above, presuppositions and impli-
cations encode propositions that are not explicitly expressed. Some presupposed propo-
sitions may be untrue or may simply be promoting the positive in-group evaluation. An 
opinion may also be implied or inferred from a statement, which might be understood 
as saying something true or false or even dangerous. Statements such as ‘calling Nigeria 
a place of interest at this moment despite the fact the Nigerian oligarchy has not and will 
never condemn terrorism is absurd’ (P82) and ‘Nigeria is not a country in any sense, 
those in most part of Hausa land are not different from the hardcore terrorist you find in 
Yemen or Egypt’ (P83) leave a dangerous presupposition that Nigeria is indeed associ-
ated with terrorism, which the world was not aware of before the attempt on the 
American airline on Christmas day in 2010. That the ‘Nigerian oligarchy has not and 
will never condemn terrorism’ (P82) also implies (falsely) that the Nigerian government 
supports acts of terrorism, Nigeria herself being a victim of terrorist attacks in recent 
times. For instance, the UN building in Abuja was bombed by terrorists in August 2011, 
killing over 20 people, some of whom were Nigerians. In the north, there have been 
frequent reports of bombings that not only targeted the police but also journalists and 
civilians, resulting in the deaths of both northerners and southerners. These attacks were 
said to be carried out by the Boko Haram Islamic sect who also claimed responsibility 
for the pro-election crises that claimed many lives, including those of Youth Service 
Corp members serving in some northern states. These attacks were not targeted solely 
at southerners. After the terrorist attempt on a US airplane, the Nigerian government 
strongly condemned the act. This action of government was condemned by the BOCG 
(e.g. in P80). The then Minister of Information, Professor Dora Akuyili (an Igbo), was 
criticized for being the mouthpiece of Nigeria. This, of course, confirms that the 
Nigerian government indeed condemns terrorism. The proposition that ‘the North of 
Nigeria will soon supersede the rest of the world as terrorist producers’ is not only 
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another dangerous argument, but also expresses an individual’s opinion/value judge-
ment that implies that Nigeria has been a producer of terrorists in the past. This is not 
true. The question is: what does this kind of proposition intend to achieve? First, this is 
part of the ideological emphasis given to the bad properties of the out-group Other 
(Nigeria) that is expected to produce a negative opinion of and attitude to Nigeria by the 
international community. Second, it is part of the strong arguments of the BOCG which 
forms the basis of their resistance, that is the North is bad, the North is terrorist; the 
South is good, the South is Christian, therefore they cannot co-exist as one country. The 
historical experience of the Biafran war, which up until the present time is still being 
viewed as ongoing because of the perceived marginalized status of the Igbos in Nigeria, 
remains fresh in the minds of the BOCG. Therefore, the verbal war going on in the 
BOCG forums forms part of this resistance of a people seeking justice.
P83. Washington got to listen to Biafrans at this moment, Nigeria is not a country in any sense, 
those in most part of hausaland are not different from the hardcore terrorist you find in Yemen 
or Egypt. The North of Nigeria will soon supersede the rest of the world as terrorist producers. 
(Iguedo, posted 27 December 2009, 11.25 p.m.)
The implications and presuppositions of opinions and value judgements in the data 
express socio-economic and political propositions, most of which are obvious assump-
tions that promote positive representation of Us and negative representation of Them. 
Nigeria is often constructed as the initiator of actions that aim at destroying the Igbos. 
Some of these propositions also clearly imply that Biafra Igbos are not Nigerian or that 
Igbos are united to fight a common enemy. In reality, this is not the case. As a matter of 
fact, the Igbos are not in the least united. For instance, the Ohaneze Ndigbo (a non-radical 
Igbo socio-cultural organization) and other Igbo elites (including the founding leader of 
the Biafra state, Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu) have consistently dissociated themselves 
from MASSOB and the BOCG in their efforts to realize the Biafran dream. While these 
other Igbo groups seek ‘reintegration’ of the Igbo in the Nigerian state and greater partici-
pation of the Igbo in the Nigerian government, the BOCG seek outright cessation (Ojukwu, 
2009). Even among the BOCG, the various small groups do not agree. For example, a 
Biafran campaign group known as ‘Ekwe Nche’ is denounced and criticized by other 
members of the BOCG.
The posts also imply that the defunct Biafran state will one day become a reality. P84, 
for example, is a proposition in the Igbo language that says: ‘Ndi Igbo anyi ga enwere 
onwanyi oge na adighianya’ (Our people, the Igbos, shall be free in a short while). This 
implies that Igbos are not free at present – a proposition which the Nigerian government 
would vehemently refute. This argument is supported by the statement in P85 that 
describes Nigeria as a dungeon: ‘I can feel how he (Ojukwu) felt when he wanted his 
people out of a dungeon called Nigeria. . .’ The word ‘dungeon’ has very strong connota-
tions. And if Nigeria is indeed a dungeon, it is certainly not just the Igbos who should 
seek freedom. Interestingly, there have been Igbos who have served in top government 
positions in previous governments in Nigeria and Igbos who have served as federal min-
isters and state governers. Yet there have not been significant changes in the living 
standards of the Igbos, even in the Igbo states where Igbos are governed by their own 
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brothers and sisters. Particularly now that Nigeria is governed by a southern president, 
the north is watching to see what happens to the general living standards of Nigerians.
For over 30 years, Nigeria was ruled by northern presidents, both military and 
civilian. Interestingly, the writer of P80 argues that the present Nigerian government is 
still being governed by the ‘Northern Oligarchy’, which implies that Jonathan’s govern-
ment is simply a stooge in the hands of the north. Similarly, P87 concludes that ‘the old 
government must repent and become new one, and stop threatening our representatives 
to work as their boys when they are meant to work for the people they represent’. The 
expression ‘working as their boys’ presupposes that southern representatives are actually 
working under certain masters (perhaps northern masters). P85 and P86, therefore, 
envisage internal struggles by other ethnic groups for independence from the ‘dungeon 
called Nigeria’. Nigeria is currently divided into six geo-political zones. These zones are 
probably what the writers of the posts refer to as ‘six nations fighting to live separate 
now’. Again, this presupposes that Nigeria is currently undergoing internal crises that 
might break up the nation as a matter of course. But, surprisingly, up to the time of this 
research, there are no obvious cessation struggles going on in the country apart from with 
the Biafrans. In the last line, however, the writer of P85 points out that his proposition 
was a mere dream.
P84. Ndi Igbo anyi ga enwere onweanyi oge na adighianya. (Osyprime, 12 June 2011, 2.30 
p.m.)
P85. Ojukwu is our number 1 Igbo man living . . . after him we start counting. I can feel how 
he felt when he wanted his people out of a dungeon called Nigeria . . . but I see the 6 nations 
fighting to live separate now . . . it is those dreams that come to pass not like a drunkard dreams. 
(profetIfeanyi, posted 22 August 2010, 12.09 p.m.)
P86. I agree ur comment six nations fighting 2 disintegrate 4rm dis dungeon called Nigeria. 
long live Ojukwu, long live true biafrans, long live Biafra. (valnadis, posted 11 July 2011, 
12.28 p.m.)
P87. With respect to Jonathan’s government when it is built with respect. I supported it and will 
only continue when it is taking us to expected future. My bitterness is against the harassment of 
the Igbos in their land. This time with correction and compensation of the former mistakes 
called extermination of defenceless Igbos, any country cannot be deceived to believe that the 
federal system they practice is what the Nigeria practice, when the time comes … The old 
government must repent and become new one, and stop threatening our representative to work 
as their boys when they are meant to work for the people they represent. (cubefeed, posted 28 
April 2010, 5.10 p.m.)
Another strategy of emphasizing the bad properties of the ‘Other’ applied by the 
BOCG is to critique, in very strong terms, some perceived unhealthy government poli-
cies. They also take advantage of the obvious general insecurity in the land, corruption 
in government, poor infrastructure, election fraud and general poverty of the citizens to 
condemn the government. In P8, for example, the writer argues that Biafrans sharing the 
same country with ‘these Muslim Hooligans’ would result in sharing with the ‘shame of 
Nigeria’. This ‘shame’ (implying that Nigeria is currently in shame for whatever reason, 
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or is promoting shameful activities) includes the destruction of public education, in order 
that ‘money bags’ (a metaphor for corrupt government officials) may continue to send 
their ‘spoilt brats’ overseas to be educated. This again implies that corrupt politicians 
deliberately ignore education development in the country because they can afford the 
option of sending their children abroad. This argument has been an ongoing one in 
Nigerian social and political discourse. The writer goes on to say: ‘for those Ndigbo and 
people of other nations stranded in Nigeria, make distinction of yourself’. ‘Ndigbo’ 
(Igbos), according to the writer, are ‘stranded in Nigeria’. The serious implication of this 
proposition is that Igbos are not Nigerians, because only a traveller can be stranded. A 
stranded traveller, of course, is never at rest until he gets to his destination. So the writer 
categorizes the Igbos with the ‘people of other nations’, who are also stranded in the 
country. By implication, the Igbo may never rest until they get home; Nigeria to them is 
never a home.
The writer of P9 possibly felt the same way when he asked: ‘are you guy prepared to 
live in the Islamic Republic of Nigeria. Personally I am not. Laugh this off if you like . . . 
(it) is coming unless you join with the Biafran train right now!’ ‘Personally I am not’ 
implies that this writer has several options to free himself of his Nigerian identity. For 
instance, if he is already in the USA, he can acquire American citizenship and remain 
abroad; or continue to radically support the Biafran struggle until Biafra becomes a real-
ity as hoped. So he urges his readers to support the cause immediately. This call sounds 
similar to the kind of urgent call to join the Tunisian or Egyptian protests, as in the 
examples below:
(i)  Everyone come to Tahrir now we need you we are no less than 10,000 and no more police 
#JAN25 16:42:32 Jan 25. (Ghonim Wael Ghonim)
(ii)  جييييج don’t let the police intimidate us with their presence, they always have been 
there and always will, it’s time to move #Jan25. (Gsquare86 Gigi Ibrahim) (Cited from 
Tweets from Tahrir, by Idle and Nunns, 2011, Kindle, 355–359)
The denunciation of Nigeria continued in P21 where the writer wrote: ‘Nigeria is not 
a great nation; it is not one of them; it has never been; it has no way to navigate out of 
this because it is already sunk. . .’ This type of proposition is not only pessimistic about 
Nigeria’s future, but presupposes that previous assumptions about Nigeria being a great 
nation were false. While the writer did not explain the indices for qualification as a ‘great 
nation’, one can infer from his previous statements that he referred to socio-economic 
development. P25 identified other pitfalls such as political instability and election fraud. 
According to the writer, ‘election rigging’ has been the vogue in Nigeria since it gained 
independence. He blamed the civil war on ‘massive rigging’ of the regional and federal 
elections of 1964–1965. Over 40 years later, another war against the Biafrans seemed to 
continue unabated. ‘War’ was used as a metaphor for what the writer described as 
‘stealthy intrigues and sabotages’ – ‘a secret war against the rights, dignity and aspira-
tions of the Igbos’. One way the Nigerian government achieved this was to install a 
‘puppet’ government in Anambra state (an Igbo state) and to perpetually disenfranchise 
certain people. Again, whether these accusations are right or wrong presupposes that the 
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government of Nigeria has been guilty of political fraud and that certain sections of 
society are aggrieved for injustice and human rights violations committed against them, 
particularly the Igbo population.
As pointed out earlier in the analysis, the Nigerian government has been accused 
not only by the BOCG but also by other social critics of corruption and mismanagement 
of public funds, and it is said that despite huge earnings from oil, the average Nigerian 
lives on less than $2 a day (Chiluwa, 2011a). The writer of P37 argues that in spite of 
the ‘record oil revenues in 2008, government corruption and mismanagement robbed 
Nigerians of their rights to health and education’. This statement again implies that 
although Nigeria ranks among the poorest nations, the country actually derives suf-
ficient income from oil to develop the nation. However, the standard of living for its 
citizens remains among the lowest in the world. This type of social criticism coming 
from an opposition group is understandable, yet evidence of corruption and financial 
fraud in Nigeria remains common knowledge. These critiques are an indirect call to 
the government to be held accountable and to initiate sound policies to alleviate the 
suffering of its people.
Conclusion
The Biafran resistance comprises text-based online resistance, without immediate and 
corresponding offline protests. These are efforts of self-determination towards achiev-
ing a separate independent state for the Igbos of south-eastern Nigeria. The BOCG 
have mainly utilized discussion forums and customized websites for their online activ-
ism. Their resistance has been characterized by campaigns, and social criticism. They 
have also gone to ‘verbal war’ against the Nigerian government, presumably populated 
by the northern political elite. While MASSOB – an offline campaign group (with its 
militia arm) – has organized ‘successful’ protest marches in the past, the group has not 
been primarily mobilized by social media; rather, it has been motivated and organized 
by its leader (Uwazuruike), who probably could have been aided by social media 
networks.
While it is difficult to predict the same degree of success of the protests in North 
Africa for that of Nigeria, it is not altogether untrue that the Biafran online resistance is 
not impactful. The results may be slower but they are certainly progressive. With the 
increasing rate of social media use in Nigeria, it is possible that more Igbo youths are 
becoming sensitized to the Biafra question. Those who have been ignorant of the Biafran 
revolution of 1967, due to the deliberate policy of the Nigerian government to mitigate 
this aspect of Nigerian history, are getting sufficient information about the perceived 
genocide committed against the Igbos by the Nigerian government.
One of the main security implications of the Biafran online campaigns is that 
their potential should not be underestimated. The deliberate and consistent negative 
representations of Nigeria’s roles in the civil war, and the fronting of the instances of 
victimization and murder of Igbos in contemporary Nigeria, are a very strong discur-
sive strategy in favour of the BOCG. Igbos are repeatedly portrayed as prisoners and 
slaves in their own country; this is heightened by the postings of media reports about 
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police harassment of the Igbos and MASSOB members. These are likely to provoke 
greater ethnic nationalism and incite mass action in support of the Biafran cause. It is 
even possible that many Igbo youths are signing up to online Biafran forums on a 
daily basis, and that they are directly or indirectly being mobilized for a physical 
offline protest in future. It is also likely that the Biafrans in Diaspora maintain strong 
educated offline groups locally in addition to MASSOB, who are currently being 
sensitized and trained through the Internet. They may also have other plans to realize 
their objectives. If one of their goals – to sensitize the international community in 
regard to the Biafran challenge – is achieved, the BOCG would have influenced opinion 
in their favour and gained the support of the international community.
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Notes
1. See Tao (2011). According to Maya Tao, all routes to Egyptian networks were withdrawn 
from the Internet’s global routing table; consequently, no websites were accessible within 
Egypt during Mubarak’s regime. Despite the rising death toll during the crisis, demonstrators 
bypassed the government ban on Facebook and Twitter and networked among each other, con-
tributing approximately 8% of all tweets. Editors from mashable.com gathered social media 
usage statistics using the real-time analytical tool, Trendr.
2. Wikipedia, 2011.
3. Wikipedia, 2011.
4. See Sue Boetcher (http://www.fullcirc.com/community/communitywhatwhy.htm).
5. See Sue Boetcher (http://www.fullcirc.com/community/communitywhatwhy.htm).
6. The Ahiara Declaration was the principle of the Biafran revolution which forms Ojukwu’s 
national broadcast on the occasion of the second anniversary of the new Biafran state on 1 June 
1969.
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